By: Günes-Ayata, Ayse,
Innovation in Social Sciences Research, 13606263, 1992, Vol. 5, Issue 3
Contents
I. Historical Background
II. The Corumlu(n10) Alevi Community in Ankara
III. Conclusion
Bibliography:
References
ABSTRACT
The Alevi comprise a specific ethnic group in Turkey of especial interest. In presenting a case study of an Alevi community in Ankara that arose out of internal urban migration, the present paper delineates the way in which the Alevis have moved away from constituting a counterculture during the period of the Ottoman period to comprising a working class subculture of great organizational and political potential in contemporary Turkey. The paper also describes the ethnic markedness of the Alevi community and the problems that arise out of this markedness.
I. Historical Background
As is the case for all ethnic groups in Turkey, to give a population figure for the Alevi is extremely difficult. An additional difficulty with estimating the number of the Turkish Alevi population lies with the fact that apart from the Turkish-speaking Alevis that constitute the majority, there are also Kurdish speaking Alevis( n1). A realistic estimation would lie something around 20% of the Turkish Republic’s population, that is about ten million, including the Kurdish and Zaza speaking groups. In this paper I discuss only the Turkish Alevis, the number of whom is estimated to be 8 million at the most. Traditionally the Alevis had lived in a corridor crosscutting Turkey from north to south about 200 km east of Ankara. To the east of that corridor, the Alevis would be Kurdish speaking. Turkish-Alevi villages can also be found in the mountainous regions of West and South Anatolia( n2).
The Alevis comprised a counterculture all through the Ottoman history. For a very long period they resisted the sedentary life which was proposed by the Ottomans — who tried to have a better grasp of the periphery through the Islamic code while at the same time favouring the Sunni sects — as a better means for social control( n3). The Alevi tried to retain their ethnic purity and language and slip away from the central authority by being nomads( n4).
The Ottoman rule system alienated the Alevis in two ways. First, together with the majority of the Anatolian population, they were not integrated into the ruling elite; Ottomans preferred to assign rootless, converted, non-muslim individuals to administrative positions. Second, the Ottoman system did not allow for descent in the Muslim community to become a basis for social organization. This led to the marginalization of the Alevis and rendered the community a troublesome one for the Ottomans. Nevertheless, their seclusion and alienation enabled the Alevis to retain some kind of a cultural specificity and a peculiar form of Islam which has survived till now.
Alevi opposition (as discussed by Nur Vergin), signified a specific side of a binary opposition, which later somehow came to correspond to the culture of modern Republican Turkey. As opposed to the centre, which was dominantly urban, elite, ethnically heterogeneous, multilingual (mainly Arabic and Farsi) Orthodox Sunni, and Ottomanist, the Alevi represented a nomadic peripheral minority of ordinary people and peasants of Turkish origin, but marked by heterogeneity in terms of religion, culture and language. This latter set of ideological variables came to represent the Republican nation-state ideals. It was for these reasons that the Alevis offered their overwhelming support to the Turkish republic in the hope of averting Sunni hegemony( n5).
Yet, the outcome was not as favourable for the Alevis as was hoped for and expected. While, with the emergence of the Turkish elite Republic, the problem ceased to be one of state ideology and structure, it survived as predominantly a social problem of integration.
When laicism was accepted as a form of state, the Republic did not only separate state affairs from religious codes and institutions, but also tried to control religion by trying to establish uniformity and centralization, the uniform religion being Sunni Islam. By the time the Republic was founded, religious practice was, in principle, no longer much of a problem for the Alevi; nor was there such a strong Sunni hegemony in state or in society. Yet the centralization in society and the increasing difficulty with leading secluded lives rendered the practice of Alevi tradition and religion difficult. To reiterate, with the foundation of the Republic, the practice of minority religion was not rendered difficult because of prosecution, but out of the rapid diffusion of Sunni traditions and Western lifestyles. Currently, most of the Alevi would agree that they are in the process of losing their religious traditions and of becoming a specific, albeit to an extent integrated, cultural group; what is certain is that they no longer comprise a religious group of opposition and revolt.
A contributing factor in this respect has been internal, and specifically urban, migration. During the time when the Alevis comprised a nomadic population, inter-ethnic/religious contact between the Alevi and the Sunni was minimal. Had, and when, it occurred it would still mean little in terms of inter-cultural integration given that the two communities shared little in terms of lifestyles. Therefore it is not surprising to observe that at the time, when the Alevis settled they settled apart from the Sunni; mixed villages were very uncommon and extreme endogamy was practiced. Needless to say this lack of interaction led to ethnic tensions: the Alevi were scorned as heretics, especially in relation to their attitudes vis-à-vis the seclusion of women.
The interaction between the two communities became unavoidable with urban migration. Until the early 60s, the Sunnis inhabited both urban and rural areas, in opposition to the Alevis who were then still a predominantly rural population. Hence, for the Alevis urban migration came to mean not only interaction with other migrants but more significantly interaction with other urban groups. Moreover, like any migrant group, they began to threaten the existing status quo in so far as they tried to establish in-roads of social mobility for themselves. They went abroad to accumulate capital and brought back remittances. They also entered the competition for jobs, houses, credits and all kinds of urban resources. And in being successful they radically altered the class and status structures of towns and cities.
As an Alevi politician recently noted( n6), in small towns where even an Alevi grocer was unthinkable in the late times, the Alevi migrants began to return in the 60s with Mercedes cars and money to buy business and real estate. As a result, the rate of inter-ethnic marriages also increased, and the occurrence of elopements was by that time very frequent. Yet, as westernized lifestyles became readily accepted by the Alevis, this increased the stigmatization about their conduct( n7). As interaction increased, integration became more problematic and, consequently, enmities between the Alevis and the Sunnis increased. To this should be added that with time these enmities came to correspond to ideological cleavages, in so far as the Alevis lean traditionally to the left while the small-town Sunnis typically to the right. In the late 70s, this led to open clashes between the two groups.
In comparison, the 1980s were a calm period. This was partly the result of the military coup, and partly the result of the Alevi retreat into a more obscure minority life. The mechanism of ‘disguise of identity’ also characterizes the Alevis like many other minority groups. However, in the case of the Alevis, this mechanism has a specific political colouring. Alevi identity has never been openly expressed in terms of minority rights but has rather been used for the political bargaining for votes( n8).
The Alevis have always been considered an important vote bank for left wing parties( n9). Until the beginning of the 1980s they had a party of their own, but remained with limited representation. During the 80s decade they began to divide their vote potential and some even moved in the direction of the New Right. The important thing to note, in this respect, however, is their alignment with mainstream political parties and their continuing and important contribution to the Left, where they, at present, have a weighted representation.
The Alevis constitute a major political force in the municipal politics in Ankara, and their weight is beyond their population ratio in the city. This is due to their overrepresentation in SDPP (Social Democratic Populist Party) cadres, which they predominate because of their ideological preferences and organizational capacity. Out of six district mayors in Ankara four are Alevi (both of Turkish and Kurdish origin); the majority of municipal council members are also Alevis. Through similar channels they hold a weighted ratio of MPs in the SDPP group and through coalition there are four Alevi ministers in the government.
The development and redefinition of the ethnic identity of the Alevis is illustrated by a preliminary study carried out on an Alevi community in Ankara which I will describe in some more detail in what follows. What I hope to show by means of this case study is the way in which, within the framework of city life which, by nature, involves more cosmopolitan, heterogeneous and pluralist lifestyles, the clashes between ethnic groups are more disguised and subtle, but by no means less important. Rather their character is different, in so far as they are more political and ideological, comprising class-like interest-oriented struggles.
II. The Corumlu(n10) Alevi Community in Ankara
The research done on the urban migrants in Turkey reveals that migrants comprise groups with strong solidarity networks that act as interest groups. They have their formal associations and engage in the struggle for resources. Yet, contrary to the so-called melting-pot theory, sociological research in Turkey teaches us that in urban areas ethnicity not only wanes but rather develops, increases and is even reinforced with the years. Ethnic networks in urban environments act as protective nets and serve instrumental purposes, such as finding a job or accommodation. In addition, Turkish squatter housing areas have come to form, as a result of a segregational settlement process, agglomerated dwellings of different ethnic groups. Within the urban environment however inter-ethnic interaction persists often leading to disputes and differentiated life styles but also to the formation of instrumental coalitions in the fight for resource allocation.
In Ankara, the Alevis constitute a segregated community, which is highly exclusionary in terms of marriage, social relations and social networks. Corum, where this group of Alevis come from, is very close to Ankara, only about 200 km from the city. This proximity increases the potential of this community to retain its linkages with the village. Eighty-five percent of Corumlu go once or twice a year to their village. Even though their village is depopulating rapidly it still serves as their contact basis. There are various reasons besides the proximity for keeping this contact. First the norm as well as practice amongst the Corumlu Alevi has changed to that of the nuclear family. What this usually means is that the great majority of the elderly stay on in the village and this inevitably necessitates frequent trips in order to visit them. Second, given that 77% of the Corumlu work in salaried or wage employment, they have regular yearly holidays that they spend working in the fields in order to bring back their yearly staples. Finally, an additional motivating factor for keeping up the links with the village is the death ceremonies. The city funeral ceremony is organized by the state mosques and is, therefore, predominantly Sunni in character; this implies that the only way to avoid having a Sunni funeral service is to carry that out in the village.
All in all, a strong communication link between the city and the village is maintained. In actual fact, the village serves to get news and information from the migrants to other cities, migrants to Europe, even those that live in different areas of Ankara. Consequently, the maintenance of the link with the village becomes so-to-speak an essential part of city life. There are even migrants that claim that they will return to the village once they have retired; some have built new houses in the village and have bought agricultural land.
Regarding city life and networking, it is almost always the case that new working migrants are provided with temporary accommodation by their relatives and people from the same village and given information, or even references, where possible about finding a job. Given that the majority of the Alevi are employed, as already indicated, in salaried employment, one does not observe amongst the Alevi the formation of ethnic businesses, so they hardly ever provide work to their co-villagers. As distinct from other groups such as Kurds internal vertical differentiation amongst the Alevi is very low. They are a relatively egalitarian group not only ideologically but also sociologically. In fact vertical linkages do not exist. They do not have friends and relatives from prosperous and powerful sections of the society.
In short, and although there is a concentration of the Alevi in the area, the kinship concentration in the same squatter housing area or in business is lower than with other groups e.g. Kurds. This of course increases the dependency on the nuclear family. It is interesting to note in this respect that whereas almost no male Kurds say that they rely on their spouses for comfort and advice when in difficulty, 25% of the Alevi men talk only to their wives in case of trouble. Corumlu Alevi consider discussing such problems with non-relatives as telling family secrets.
It is therefore not surprising to note that Alevi women are much less secluded than their Kurdish or Turkish Sunni counterparts. This was always a characteristic of the Alevi community but seems to have become more so through urban migration. With the exception of the elderly, Alevi women do not cover their heads, and they speak freely to male relatives and neighbours. There is the tendency to send girls as well as boys to school, if the economic conditions are suitable( n11). There is a much higher ratio of working women and as a result women are, in general, free to go around alone in the neighbourhood even in the city. This in fact is the major source of conflict between the Corumlu Alevi and their Sunni neighbours. Whether of Turkish or Kurdish origin, the Sunni women have, in general, much secluded lives. Their honour is seen as a derivation of their seclusion, therefore there is a tendency to see the Alevi women as dishonourable. Moreover their menfolk are accused of not preserving female honour, and of not even intending to do so. This leads to segregational marriage. Sunni families see the Alevis as an inferior ethnic group and do not wish their girls to interact closely with them. Through time some elderly women with years of good neighbourly relations may engage in mixed social activity, but girls are less likely to, except at school. Not surprisingly, this creates a lot of resentment amongst the Alevi vis-à-vis the Sunnis.
The Alevi consider themselves as honest, correct, straightforward and loyal and as such reliable. Their inter-group solidarity is high even if it does not always translate into economic help. They tend to think very highly of their ethnic mates, and are very likely to become involved in local politics.
Regarding marriages, the Alevis have a rather contradictory attitude. On the one hand, they claim to have a liberal attitude towards their children in so far as the latter are allowed to choose their partners. As both girls and boys have much less controlled daily lives, their chances of having mixed marriages is higher. Yet, the Alevi react more severely to the idea of mixed marriages, especially of girls, because they feel that their daughters will be scorned in the new family. So the solution has been to keep close contacts with the other Alevis, and frequent occasions, such as wedding, cem( n12), tea parties, house visits are promoted in order to enable youngsters to meet each other.
This partial but fight network is also reflected in politics. As already noted, the Alevis have an important potential for vote mobilization, and this is reinforced by their organizational skills. Since the early years of the Republic the Alevis supported the secularist policies, and with the further association of Islam and the right, they began to support the left. Together with their organizational potential, they began to be a major part of left-wing politics in Turkey. All of my respondents were very interested in local and national politics. And all of them had participated in some political groups of one kind or another. Amongst the Alevi compared to other groups the relations between the kins and co-villagers seem to be much less demanding, structured and intense. Even though they tend to make use of ethnicity in a very limited sense, including only people from their own vicinity, they tend to think very highly of their ethnic mates. They argue that their ethnic solidarity increases in the city, and those that are not passionately solidaristic have personality problems rather than putting the blame on the city life.
III. Conclusion
In short, even though the Alevi retain their village links and do not have the disadvantage of language differences, they have much less potential for initial help, and are furthermore a much less differentiated and stratified group and hence cannot establish vertical linkages, a fact which limits their capacity to mobilize resources. They have, however, through the years in the city, organized a cooperative network using their organizational capacity and numbers as a potential for political advancement and the promotion of social contacts (less so or not yet for economic advantages). Alevi identity is a stigmatized identity, therefore it is not made into a potential for open advancement, but it is used through the cover-up of other cultural and political symbols.
As a conclusion we can say that the shared experiences of city life lead to a re-interpretation of ethnic identity. In so far as Alevi identity is considered a stigmatized identity, the Alevi solidaristic ethnic network is converted into a secularized political discourse of the left. Being predominantly working class, they thus end up constituting a distinct working class subculture with its organizational, cooperative and political potential. Thus the counterculture of the Ottoman period has gradually become a pressure group very much within the Republican ideology and modern set up of contemporary Turkey.
Bibliography:
Andrews, P. (1989), Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey, Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, Wiesbaden
Heper, Metin (1983), Türkiyede Kent-Göçmeni ve Bürokratik örgütler, Tasvir Yay., Istanbul
Karpat, K. (1975): ‘The politics of transition: political attitudes and party affiliation in Turkish Shanty towns’, in E.Akarli (ed.), Political Participation in Turkey, Bogaziçi Univ. Yayinlari, Istanbul
Mandel, R. (1989) ‘Turkish Headscarves and ‘foreigner problem’; constructing difference through emblems of identity’, in New German Critique, No. 45 Winter
Mardin, S. (1973) ‘Center Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics’, Deadalus, Winter
Sener, C. (1991) ‘Alevilik Olayi’, Cem Yayinlari, Ankara
Vergin, N. (1991), ‘Din ve Muhalif Olmak: Bir Halk dini Olarak Alevilik’, Türkiye Günlügü, Sayi 17, Kls.
References
(n1.) In fact, there is a long-standing discussion concerning the ‘real’ ethnic origin of the Kurdish-speaking Alevis: some argue they are Kurds that have lost their religion; others that they are Turks that have lost their language.
(n2.) Cf. Andrews 1989.
(n3.) Cf. Mardin 1973.
(n4.) Cf. Vergin 1991.
(n5.) Cf. Vergin 1991.
(n6.) See Sener 1991.
(n7.) Cf. Mandel 1989.
(n8.) Cf. Heper 1983.
(n9.) Cf. Karpat 1975.
(n10.) The following is based on research conducted amongst the Alevi of the province of Corum who have migrated to Ankara. 100 questionnaires and interviews were carried out. This research has been financed by ME Awards of Ford Foundation.
(n11.) In this respect they seem not to discriminate between boys and girls. They consider formal education an important positive value and ensure that at least one of their children is sent to school in order to acquire qualifications that will make upward mobility possible (even, if often this is vain because of poverty).
(n12.) Cem is a special religious ceremony of the Alevis. In opposition to Sunni tradition it involves drinking, singing and dancing.
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By Ayse Günes-Ayata
iBook 용 파일 : Turkish Alevis – Gunes-Ayata_ Ayse
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